
The New World Order and Army Doctrine

The Doctrinal Renaissance of Operations Short of War?

Jennifer Morrison Taw, Robert C. Leicht

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Jennifer Morrison Taw, Robert C. Leicht

Prepared for the
United States Army

RAND

PREFACE

The research presented here was undertaken within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND's Arroyo Center for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army (DCSOPS). The report examines the development of Army doctrine relevant to MOSW (military operations short of war) and NCO (non-combat operations) and how doctrinal treatment of non-conventional operations¹ affects the Army's capabilities in low intensity conflict (LIC) environments. In particular, it considers the relative status of non-conventional operations to Army operations as a whole; the projected post-Cold War increase in Army combat and non-combat missions in non-conventional environments; and the broader issue of the Army's mission within the evolving post-Cold War peacetime strategy. The study also examines LIC doctrine and the overall utility of LIC as a concept, and compares the doctrine with new and renascent doctrinal concepts relevant to operations in LIC.

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¹Non-conventional operations are held to be those which are governed by LIC doctrine, to include military operations short of war and, in some cases, non-combat support operations.

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SUMMARY

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the conventional conflict in Europe for which the United States has spent nearly 50 years preparing has little likelihood of occurring. The continued relevance of maintaining a large U.S. military force structure under these circumstances has been questioned. The U.S. Army needs to define new roles for itself that will take into account the changes under way in the world. The focus of American policy will become more global, requiring a far wider range of roles for the Army. Indeed, President Bush's articulation of a "New World Order" suggests that the United States will become more involved in promoting stability and security in and among developing nations. This is particularly significant for the Army, which will have to expand its capabilities from conventional battlefield warfighting to include operations in low intensity conflict (LIC) environments.

Such a move would counteract more than a decade of relegating non-conventional issues to relative obscurity. Indeed, renewed interest in such issues is stirring debate, since resistance within the Army to non-conventional missions is deep-seated. Doctrine and training are already changing in response to the international environment, however, with the inclusion of such concepts as peacetime missions and the operational continuum. If this trend continues, a new generation of soldiers will be sensitized to the value of non-conventional capabilities across all environments.

OBJECTIVE

This report examines the Army's role in the Third World from a doctrinal perspective. It looks at the Third World environment, traces the evolution of Army doctrine applicable to that environment, outlines some of the problems with current doctrine, and discusses aspects of draft doctrine that, in part, alleviate those problems.

NON-CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS: MILITARY OPERATIONS SHORT OF WAR AND NON-COMBAT OPERATIONS

The U.S. Army must prepare itself simultaneously for two kinds of conflict in the Third World. On the one hand, it is possible that the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and the multitude of arms

races and military buildups in the Third World will lead to more conflicts along the lines of Operation Desert Storm, involving conventional battles in which large forces engage in combined operations. Yet, unless a critical U.S. interest such as oil is at stake, it is unlikely that the United States will get involved. On the other hand, more likely scenarios involve single countries with internal struggles that range across political, economic, psychological, and social as well as military dimensions. Given recently expressed U.S. interest in promoting international stability and security, it is not unreasonable to assume increased future U.S. involvement in such limited regional disputes, especially at the advisory level. In meeting the demands of these kinds of conflicts, the Army must retain its conventional capabilities, expand its non-conventional capabilities, and consider its appropriate role in broader U.S. peacetime operations aimed at decreasing the causes of internal unrest in Third World nations.

The end of the Cold War has thus had two doctrinal effects on the Army. It has raised the issue of peacetime missions for the Army and caused the reappearance of military operations short of war (MOSW) and non-combat operations (NCO) in Army doctrine. In spite of high-level acknowledgment of and support for these concepts, considerable resistance to them still exists in the Army. Some fear they will divert attention and resources from the more important combat roles, and others worry about a new colonialism. Moreover, the concept of a peacetime mission for the Army has eclipsed and subsumed the issue of reincorporating MOSW and NCO into Army doctrine, lessening the chances for their consideration as a distinct issue.² The effect is doubly unfortunate because these concepts have utility in war as well as peace. Operation Just Cause contains examples of their effective employment and of situations in which the failure to apply them yielded less than optimal results.

EVOLUTION OF ARMY DOCTRINE

Doctrine pertaining to non-conventional conflict has evolved both in its own right and as an aspect of overarching—or capstone—doctrine. In its own right, its history has largely been one of ad hoc development. It began in the Kennedy era as a response to communist-inspired wars of national liberation and referred predominantly to counterguerrilla operations, drawing from the Army's experience.

²This is less true since the time this report was written. MOSW (now called military operations other than war, or MOOTW) is enjoying renewed attention. This is a very positive development.

Centered on the liberal use of military power to counter threats to developing nations, this doctrine held that the United States played the predominant role, with subsidiary assistance from indigenous forces. Its relevancy to the field was questionable, especially with propensity resting with the Special Warfare Center. Over time, counter-guerrilla warfare became synonymous with special operations.

Distinct doctrinal publications dealing with the broader topic of counterrevolutionary warfare did not appear until the Army attempted to capture its Vietnam experience, in which military power became a component of the political struggle to defeat the insurgent. Subsequent versions of FM 100-5 (in 1972 and 1974) incorporated principles inherent in the Nixon, or Guam, doctrine which held the host nation responsible for the conduct of the effort and defined the U.S. Army's role as one of support with logistics, training, and advice.

By the early 1970s, doctrine pertaining to non-conventional operations had gone through a number of theoretical and semantic permutations, each of which took a more realistic and balanced view of the utility of U.S. military power in support of a host nation. However, widespread acceptance was made unlikely by inopportune timing, with the end of the Vietnam war and the Arab-Israeli war dominating the attention of the Army. A subsequent version in 1981 reflected a division of low intensity conflict by role and scope, but the descriptions differed little from those of conventional combat roles. The deficiencies in this doctrine drew sharp criticism from a senior U.S. field commander that resulted in a new interest in MOSW and NCO. This new interest translated into greater instructional and doctrinal attention, which is reflected in the current LIC doctrine. Its most noteworthy feature is the indirect application of military power in support of the host nation.

Capstone and Joint Doctrine

The history of LIC in capstone publications has been equally checkered. The 1962 version of FM 100-5, the Army's principal doctrinal manual, reflected the national policy of flexible response in its vision of war as a spectrum ranging from cold war to all-out general war. The 1968 version remained essentially the same but added "nation building" and marked the demise of the counterinsurgency period with the substitution of Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategy for counterinsurgency.

However, by 1976, the concept of operations short of conventional war disappeared from the manual. The focus fell squarely on the conven-

tional battlefield in Europe and ways to counter a numerically superior foe. The 1982 version, with the advent of AirLand Battle, became more balanced, adding an offensive orientation and a new—for the U.S. Army—level of war: the operational. However, operations short of war were still dismissed. The effect was to convince a generation of soldiers that armies existed to fight conventional war, implying that anything short of that type of conflict was someone else's responsibility. In 1986, the revision of FM 100-5 validated the AirLand Battle concept and tentatively acknowledged war at the lower end of the spectrum. But it, too, suffered from the confusion of definitions found in the LIC doctrinal publications.

The Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) is the source for LIC doctrine in joint publications and the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the primary review authority. Not surprisingly, therefore, joint LIC doctrine reflects the Army's quite closely, to include the definitional confusion and implicit lack of relevance to conventional operations. Subordinate joint publications, known as Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) manuals, offer some promise of being more useful.

Problems with LIC Doctrine

Two major problems afflict "LIC" doctrine. First, it suffers from poorly defined concepts. The phrase "low intensity conflict" can refer simultaneously to an environment, conflicts within that environment, or to categories of operations. This sort of definitional ambiguity makes it difficult to discuss the doctrine with any precision. A second problem is that the doctrine is not integrated into daily operational thinking and is viewed as a specialty operation.

ALTERNATIVES TO EXTANT LIC DOCTRINE

Current LIC doctrine suffers from a variety of problems. However, developing doctrine has some concepts that begin to address these issues. Two of these are "peacetime engagement," which in its current configuration views the military as part of a larger effort to promote stability and national development, and an "operational continuum," which allows visualization of operations across all environments.

In one of its current configurations, peacetime engagement has six components that include counterterrorism, counternarcotics, security assistance, and unconventional warfare. Whether or not peacetime engagement continues to develop along these lines, it is likely that a peacetime mission for the United States will be developed that com-

bines foreign internal defense and nation assistance in some manner. The U.S. military will probably play a supportive role in larger U.S. governmental efforts. Yet the military as a whole has had little experience in non-combat missions or operations short of war, especially within politically sensitive environments. Such an expansion of the U.S. military's mission would therefore need to be addressed in both doctrine and training.

The operational continuum offers a new way of conceptualizing the political, economic, and combat environment within which military operations may take place. As a concept, the operational continuum avoids the problems associated with the more rigid spectrum of conflict featured in the early doctrinal manuals. Rather than labeling conflict in terms of intensity (by any measure, whether it be numbers killed, length of the conflict, or numbers of troops involved), the operational continuum identifies conflict environments by the nature of the conflict and the tools of influence that will be most effective: informational, political, economic, or military.

CONCLUSIONS

We draw two major conclusions from our study of "LIC" doctrine. First, progress toward a workable, integrated doctrine has been slow, but it is occurring. Doctrinal manuals currently in draft should be published without fundamental changes, enabling the Army to move toward a better doctrine for guiding its efforts in this area. Second, the Army cannot continue to maintain its focus on conventional conflict as the primary ingredient of success to the exclusion of non-conventional capabilities. Desert Storm and the success of the AirLand Battle doctrine in that operation will provide a powerful impetus to viewing overwhelming force as the best way to limit the length of conflicts and the loss of American lives. Yet, for the U.S. military to play a successful supporting role in peacetime or in conflict—whether through training of international military students, civil affairs, or various forms of civic action—U.S. troops themselves must be adequately versed in the precepts of internal defense and development, low intensity conflict and sensitive political environments, civil-military relations, and respect for human rights. More attention must therefore be paid to the training and preparation of U.S. troops sent to low intensity conflict environments as advisors, instructors, or less probably, combatants. This requires a doctrinal overhaul, changing the focus of doctrine from the conventional battlefield to emphasize flexibility across environments, whether

peacetime, conflict, or war. Doctrinal development taking place along these lines must be fully encouraged if the Army is to remain an essential tool of U.S. foreign policy in the "New World Order."

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ABBREVIATIONS

ALB	AirLand Battle
ALBF	AirLand Battle Future
CA	Civil Affairs
CBRS	Concept-Based Requirements System
CLIC	Center for Low Intensity Conflict (Army/Air Force)
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CT	Counterterrorism
DA	Department of the Army
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
HCA	Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
IDAD	Internal Defense and Development
IMET	International Military Education and Training
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
MOSW	Military Operations Short of War
NCO	Non-Combat Operations
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
PCO	Peacetime Contingency Operations
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TC/A	Terrorism Counter/Action
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command (U.S. Army)
TPP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

1. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

For more than forty years, American defense planning assiduously prepared for a conventional war in Europe against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. However, with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR, the possibility of such a conflict has become remote. The continued requirement to maintain a large U.S. military force structure under these circumstances has been questioned. Budget skirmishes have forced policymakers and the military leadership to seek an external justification for U.S. forces; readiness for unknown contingencies, absent a discernible threat, does not justify the current force structure. The United States is therefore in the process of refocusing its attention from Europe to the world at large, redefining American foreign interests and, in so doing, considering the role of the U.S. military. President Bush, in his March 1990 presentation to Congress on National Security Strategy, partially addressed these issues by ushering in the "New World Order": an environment in which the United States, to guarantee its own stability and security, must promote international stability and security as well.

This new perception of the United States' international role has particular significance in terms of the Third World. Up until now, U.S. military efforts in the Third World, especially Latin America, have been primarily anti-communist, with an ancillary emphasis on development and democratization. Since Vietnam, these efforts have predominantly involved non-combat support operations—U.S. training of international military students, foreign internal defense (FID),¹ civic action, and so forth—in lieu of direct U.S. application of force in support of host governments. The assumption has been that through such non-combat measures the United States can help host governments (as in El Salvador) or resistance groups (as in Nicaragua) re-

¹Foreign internal defense is defined as: "Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID." Internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy is defined as: "The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." (JCS Pub 1-02; FM 100-20/AFP 3-20 (1990), Glossary.)

form themselves and their militaries sufficiently that the communists will be defeated both tactically and politically.

However, reform efforts in the Third World (subsumed in many cases to support for combat efforts) have often fallen short. Indeed, during the 1980s, the Reagan Administration openly adopted Jeane Kirkpatrick's differentiation between conservative authoritarian and communist totalitarian regimes, and did not hesitate to support the former—without pressure for reform—if it meant defeating the latter. With the receding communist threat, however, the United States can support democratization and development in the Third World in earnest. To this end, the U.S. government and military are now considering a new mission in the Third World that combines foreign internal defense with nation assistance. Currently termed "peacetime engagement," this new mission would ideally deter insurgencies and other internal conflicts in developing countries by providing U.S. support for the development of democratic institutions; functioning physical infrastructures; viable, competitive economies; and professional militaries under civilian control.

The attainment of such goals will require not only willing and eager host nations but broad, integrated U.S. governmental and military efforts. The U.S. Army would play a basically supportive role in such endeavors, using many of the same tools (FID, training of international military students, etc.) that it has used in the past. Yet, it is not clear that the Army is ready for such a mission. "Peacetime engagement"² would require a very different balance and application of Army skills and capabilities than have been used up to this point. Most Army training of international military students, for example, has been in conventional combat tactics and techniques, as opposed to training in the kinds of counterinsurgency skills appropriate to the Third World. Nor has there been much emphasis in international military student training on the appropriate role of the military in a functioning democracy or the need for adequate attention to human rights. Nor are most U.S. troops adequately prepared for either "deterrence" or combat missions in the Third World, having been trained to meet the threat of a conventional war against the Warsaw Pact.

Preparing the U.S. Army adequately for a role in peacetime engagement will require some changes in training and doctrine. This may prove problematic for two reasons, however:

²The concept of peacetime engagement is in the process of evolving and even the term itself is subject to replacement.

- As the U.S. defense budget is cut and the Army is accordingly reduced, there will be a great deal of pressure to lose as little conventional combat capability as possible. Devoting resources to non-conventional capabilities will therefore meet added resistance.
- The U.S. military's astonishing proficiency in the 1991 Gulf War with Iraq serves as a further example of the utility of tactics and techniques developed to meet the Soviet threat and may further slow efforts to redirect U.S. military capabilities.

Nonetheless, as the post-Cold War structure and mission of the U.S. Army evolve, planners will have to take into account the exigencies of the Third World and the kind of preparation the U.S. Army will need to meet them.

Objective

In this report, we examine the Army's post-Cold War Third World mission in terms of doctrine, specifically as doctrine deals with the skills required to deter or eliminate low intensity conflict (LIC). Doctrine is a useful starting point because it is "the condensed expression of [an Army's] approach to fighting campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. Tactics, techniques, procedures, organizations, force structure, equipment and training must all derive from it."³ An examination of past, present, and draft doctrine and the changes in the dissemination of doctrine through instruction in Army schools offers a good indication of how the U.S. military's role will change in the "New World Order." Low intensity conflict, for example, does not receive much attention in current capstone Army doctrine, which emphasizes a conventional battlefield war in Europe against the (former) Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Draft capstone doctrine, however, places much greater emphasis on non-combat support operations and military operations short of war. This change, if it is carried into the next iteration of capstone doctrine, will represent alternatives to conventional warfighting tactics, on the one hand, and increased attention to the requirements of conflict environments short of conventional war on the other.

APPROACH

Our report focuses on improving the Army's capabilities in offering assistance to other nations. To do so, we have analyzed the doctrinal

³FM 100-5, 1986, p. 6.

base from which they flow. We look at the origins of current doctrine in the early 1960s; its acceptance within an Army that is oriented toward fighting and operating within a conventional sphere; and if the doctrine itself aids operations (and, indeed, understanding of an environment quite unlike that with which the Army is familiar). Finally, we examine emerging doctrine to see if it appears useful for guiding soldiers as they operate around the world in situations “not war, but like war.”

ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

This report is organized into four main sections. Section 2, “Non-Conventional Operations: Military Operations Short of War and Non-Combat Operations,” outlines the rationale for reexamining the doctrinal treatment of non-conventional operations.⁴ Section 3, “Evolution of Army Doctrine,” provides the background for the treatment of low intensity conflict, military operations short of war, and non-combat operations in current capstone and LIC doctrine, and suggests why such treatment is problematic. Section 4, “Alternatives to Extant LIC Doctrine,” describes new ways to include non-conventional operations in Army and joint doctrine. Section 5, “Conclusions,” lays out our findings and suggestions. Finally, Appendix A offers a brief review of relevant doctrine, and Appendix B illustrates which Army forces are responsible for various operations short of war.

⁴Considered very simply, there are conventional operations (governed by AirLand Battle doctrine) and unconventional operations (governed by Special Operations Forces doctrine). We suggest that the term “non-conventional” operations be used in reference to those operations currently governed by low intensity conflict doctrine, to include military operations short of war and, in some cases, non-combat support operations.

2. NON-CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS: MILITARY OPERATIONS SHORT OF WAR AND NON-COMBAT OPERATIONS

THE NATURE OF CONFLICT IN THE THIRD WORLD

Changing circumstances in the Third World—the extensive proliferation of extremely lethal, accurate weapons and the buildup of large militaries, for example—may make U.S. battlefield doctrine more applicable to U.S. military operations in the Third World than it has been in the past. Events in the Persian Gulf would seem to support this conclusion. Nonetheless, the importance of non-conventional operations in the Third World should not be viewed in the context of Operation Desert Storm which, though a classic battlefield war, is probably not typical of the kinds of conflicts the United States will face. Although Third World conflicts may become both more frequent and more lethal, it is unlikely that the United States will get involved unless some interest comparable to oil is at stake. Moreover, the Gulf War was unique insofar as the United States was able to mobilize international support for its efforts; absent such support, the United States may avoid involvement. Finally, the United States will have fewer military resources to draw from in the future. Indeed, planners are treating the Gulf War as an aberration as they begin to scale U.S. forces down to rapidly deployable contingency forces. Any conflicts in which the United States does become involved will more than likely be low intensity conflicts (LIC)¹ rather than battlefield wars.

Indeed, few conflicts in the Third World involve conventional war between two or more countries. More often, they involve lawlessness, subversion, terrorism, or insurgency within a single country. Simply stated, a government faced with these kinds of internal threats must respond differently than a government faced with an external threat. The government's own legitimacy and the support it needs from its own civilians are often both at stake. For the government to survive, it must therefore fight not only a tactical battle, but a combined psychological, political, economic, and social battle as well. Although military operations may be tactically successful, if they generate new or increased support for the insurgents or the terrorists, they will

¹The term LIC is used in this report to refer to conflicts dominated by political, social, and economic struggles in which combat plays a secondary, or supportive, role.

have been counterproductive.² U.S. military support for a host government under such circumstances must take these factors into account. The United States must carefully consider whether its assistance is contributing to a professional military under civilian control with adequate respect for human rights. If not, the effort may well prove futile.

NATIONAL POLICY VS. PRACTICAL APPLICATION

Writers of Army doctrine have begun to acknowledge the proposed peacetime role of the U.S. Army. Doctrine applicable to the Third World has thus undergone two distinct changes: a peacetime mission for the Army has been incorporated into the draft version of capstone doctrine FM 100-5 (1992), and, because of their relevance to such a mission, military operations short of war (MOSW)³ and non-combat operations (NCO) have also been reincorporated into the manual.

U.S. Army Peacetime Mission

In the Guidance for the Revision of FM 100-5, the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) directed that the imperatives of capstone doctrine be reviewed as they apply in both developed and undeveloped theaters and across all environments: peacetime, conflict, and war. The perceived need for such expansion of the armed forces' role reflects not only the President's response to the "New World Order," but also U.S. military leaders' redefinition of their forces' roles in the new international situation. In a statement before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, emphasized the need for the ability to project significant combat power (as underscored by Operation Desert Storm); at the same time, he also stressed the need for increased capabilities across environments.⁴ He reiterated this point in a memo on Army Long-Range Planning Guidance:

Regional powers will continue to challenge the status quo and will be less likely to follow the lead of the military superpowers. Within the

²For further discussion of this kind of conflict, see John R. Galvin, "Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm," *Parameters*, Vol. 16, No. 4, Winter 1986, pp. 2-7.

³Since the writing of this report, the term MOSW has been supplanted by the term military operations other than war (MOOTW).

⁴Statement Before the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, First Session, 102D Congress, on the Fiscal Years 1992/1993 Department of the Army Budget, 6 March 1991, pp. 9, 21.

Third World, tensions will continue to rise as renegade leaders seek to establish hegemony over their respective regions. Highly destructive regional wars, aided by the proliferation of conventional, chemical, and nuclear weapons, will increase the lethality of the modern battlefield. New conditions require forces capable of confronting a variety of contingencies across the operational continuum.⁵

LTG Hatch, Chief of Engineers, has also stressed the importance of a proactive role for the U.S. armed forces across a range of non-combat and non-conventional tasks. He strongly supports doctrinal efforts to incorporate both non-combat and peacetime missions.⁶ Finally, in his 1991 report to the President and Congress, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney referred specifically to peacetime engagement as an existing U.S. mission.⁷

Despite these shows of support, the issue of a peacetime mission for the U.S. armed forces remains hotly debated. Opponents of such a mission fall into two broadly defined groups: conventional purists who are concerned that such a mission would undermine U.S. war-fighting capabilities by draining limited resources into humanitarian operations better left to other agencies, and anti-interventionists who believe that such involvement borders on colonialism and would benefit neither the United States nor the host nation. The concept of peacetime engagement thus continues to evolve as the opponents and advocates of an expanded Army mission provide arguments, research, and documentation on both sides.

Reincorporation of MOSW and NCO into Capstone Doctrine

Unfortunately, reconsideration of the utility of non-conventional operations has been linked to the new peacetime mission.⁸ Equating MOSW and NCO to this volatile issue works against serious consideration of NCO in their own right. The issue of a peacetime mission

⁵Memo, p. 9. The "operational continuum" will be discussed further below. Simply, it refers to a continuum of environments from peace to war.

⁶LTG Henry J. Hatch, "Security, Stability, Sustainability: Conditions for Peace," paper prepared for presentation at the National Defense University Conference on "Evolving U.S. Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean: Mutual Hemispheric Concerns and Opportunities for the 1990s," November 15-16, 1990, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

⁷Department of Defense, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress*, January 1991, pp. 6-7. Peacetime engagement, as both term and concept, has since been replaced. See page 25.

⁸See, for example, *AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond*, TRADOC PAM 525-5, 1 August 1991, p. 26.

is policy-related; the issue of whether MOSW and NCO should be reincorporated into capstone doctrine is a question of operational alternatives. Moreover, MOSW and NCO are viable not only in peace but during conflict and war as well, especially in politically volatile environments. Indeed, MOSW and NCO were included in capstone doctrine in the past; it is only since the mid-1970s that they have been relegated to supporting doctrine, as will be discussed below.

Currently, only Special Operations Forces (SOF)⁹ doctrine, civil affairs (CA) doctrine,¹⁰ and LIC doctrine¹¹ address non-combat operations and operations short of war. The potential reintegration of these operations into capstone doctrine is significant, for it means that such operations will be brought back into the purview of the conventional forces at a time when such forces must be prepared for missions outside Europe. This addition should improve the Army's ability to function off the battlefield in environments where reliance on firepower can inflict undue collateral damage and, though perhaps tactically successful, prove to be politically counterproductive.

Operation Just Cause, for example, was a successful operation, but the United States could have benefited in the long run if the Army had been better prepared for the politically and socially volatile environment troops encountered in Panama. U.S. forces, guided by the capstone doctrine they learned in Army schools, operated in Panama City as they would have on a battlefield, with a heavy reliance on

⁹The Army has five Special Operations Forces: civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOPS), Special Operations Aviation, Special Forces (SF), and Rangers. Special operations are defined as: "Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped and organized DoD forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic, or psychological objectives. These operations may be conducted during periods of peace or hostilities. They may support conventional operations, or they may be prosecuted independently when the use of conventional force is either inappropriate or infeasible." (JCS Pub 1-02.)

¹⁰Civil affairs are defined as: "Those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or occupied country or area where military forces are present." (JCS Pub 1-02.)

¹¹Low intensity conflict is defined as: "Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain certain regional and global security implications. Also called LIC." (JCS Pub 1-02, per the DoD directive 5138.3.) Other sources provide different, sometimes more confounding, insights into LIC: "The formation of organized groups with the intention of threatening or eliminating the existence of established institutions, through force, differentiates LIC from routine peaceful competition." (Draft JCS Pub 3-07.)

overwhelming speed and firepower. Thus, despite cautionary briefings and reports that American troops showed great restraint by not returning fire into densely populated areas, at least four times as many Panamanian civilians died as military, and thousands of civilians were wounded. Many more thousands were displaced by the destruction in Panama City's poorest neighborhoods, and millions of dollars worth of damage was caused by looting in the post-invasion chaos that ensued. Nearly a year after the invasion, the Panamanian people were polled by the daily *La Prensa*. Only 37 percent believed that the invasion had solved more problems than it caused.¹²

A greater reliance on MOSW and NCO could limit and prevent collateral damage and, perhaps, foster more stable post-operational economic and political situations, thus facilitating recovery. Where such operations took place in Panama, infrastructural damage and even bloodshed were avoided. For example, shortly after the invasion began, U.S. forces occupied city public utilities sites, including power plants, water mains, telephone exchanges, television antennas, and radio systems, in order to keep Panama City's public services in operation. Most impressive, perhaps, were the shows of force which enabled Spanish-speaking U.S. Army Special Forces personnel—in many instances long-time acquaintances of the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) defenders—to convince Panamanians to surrender.¹³ Following the invasion, the U.S. military initiated a stability phase, "Operation Promote Liberty," combining nation assistance, civic action, civil-military, and constabulary missions. Although a step in the right direction, the endeavor suffered from inadequate coordination and lacked U.S. support outside the military.¹⁴ This kind of effort, had it been adequately planned in advance, could at the very least

¹²*Miami Herald*, 2 December 1990, p. 22; Robert E. Ropelewski, "Planning, Precision and Surprise Led to Panama Successes," *Armed Forces Journal*, February 1990, p. 32; Lynne Barbee, "Casualty Count in Panama Disputed," *Guardian*, 31 January 1990; Tom Wicker, "What Price Panama?" *New York Times*, 18 June 1990, pp. A15, A21; Larry Rohter, "Panama and U.S. Strive to Settle on Death Toll," *New York Times*, 1 April 1990, p. 6; Bernard Trainor, "Flaws in Panama Attack," *New York Times*, 31 December 1989, pp. 1, 6.

¹³Robert F. Dorr and Bob Archer, "The Invasion of Panama," *World Airpower Journal*, Vol. 1, Spring 1990, p. 13; Mark A. Uhlig, "In Rural Panama, Hard Questions Remain About Who's in Charge," *New York Times*, 12 January 1990, p. A16; George C. Wilson, "SouthCom Commander Rewrote Contingency Plans for Action," *Washington Post*, 7 January 1990, pp. A1, A22.

¹⁴Lawrence A. Yates, "Joint Task Force Panama: Just Cause—Before and After," *Military Review*, Vol. LXXI, No. 10, October 1991, p. 71.

have prevented the destructive looting that occurred in Panama City.¹⁵

Even when non-conventional operations took place in Panama, they were not guided by capstone doctrine but by U.S. officers' alertness and sensitivity to the circumstances within which they were operating. The inclusion of MOSW and NCO in capstone doctrine can only increase similar awareness within the Army at large, so that in the future firepower is only one of a number of alternatives for U.S. forces to achieve their objectives in low intensity conflict environments such as existed in Panama at the time of Operation Just Cause.

¹⁵In an interview with the author, a senior Army officer suggested that a minimum effort could have prevented the looting. Merely placing American military police (MPs) on street corners throughout the city following the invasion could have deterred Panamanians from destroying the business district as they did.

3. EVOLUTION OF ARMY DOCTRINE

Although the Army has had considerable experience over its history with "small wars," its doctrinal treatment of operations in that environment in the latter half of this century has been sporadic and its acceptance by the post-WWII Army has been lukewarm. The Army has successively incorporated cold war, stability, IDAD, and LIC operations into doctrine, but, as will be shown, such inclusion has been forced: indeed, whereas some would argue that the embodiment of LIC doctrine in FM 100-20 is *prima facie* evidence of its operational importance, others declare that by the creation of a separate document and the concomitant removal of such issues from capstone doctrine in FM 100-5, LIC doctrine has been relegated to a position that makes it irrelevant to the field Army. This section will trace Army doctrine for non-conventional military operations in the near past—as stand-alone doctrine, in the development of capstone doctrine, and as treated in joint publications.

DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT DOCTRINE

NCO and MOSW, although of limited use in conventional battle, are essential in the kinds of conflict and warfare that occur most frequently in the Third World, where political, economic, socio-cultural, and psychological factors are as important as military factors in the successful resolution of conflict.¹ The term "low intensity conflict" evolved in reference to this environment, coming to prominence as part of President Kennedy's reaction to Soviet-sponsored wars of national liberation. Inspired by Maxwell Taylor, Kennedy was determined that the United States would be able to answer the challenge posed by communist insurgencies in kind. As will be seen later, the Army's reply was tepid and short-lived. LIC came to develop two further meanings: wars and conflicts within this environment of political, economic, and social unrest, and U.S. military operations within this environment, specifically, support for counterinsurgency (COIN)/

¹Internal conflict—insurgencies, terrorism, and the like—has become more common than external warfare. John R. Galvin has written: "Of the 125 to 150 conflicts that have taken place in the past four decades, 90 percent occurred in developing regions and are best classified as internal wars." ("Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm," *Parameters*, Vol. XVI, No. 4, p. 5.) Galvin cited Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, p. 981.

insurgency, combating terrorism (anti- and counterterrorism),² peacekeeping operations (PKO), and peacetime contingency operations (PCO). NCO and MOSW have thus inevitably been tied to LIC doctrine.³

As the multiple meanings of "LIC" suggest, the development of Army doctrine on operations in a non-conventional environment has been more an uncoordinated, ad hoc response to unfolding events than a deliberate expression of the military's position. (Table 1 gives a broad overview of recent development of LIC doctrine.) Andrew Krepinevich argues that in the 1960s the Army responded to the political pressures of the Kennedy White House with a "cold war" doctrine of counterinsurgency, yet allowed that doctrine to be subsumed within the overwhelmingly conventional approach it took with the "Americanization" of the Vietnam War.⁴ Hence, operations were tailored more to the traditional concept of battlefield warfare than to the political and psychological realities on the ground. The relatively low priority the Army gave to the "other war" of counterinsurgency and pacification both led to and caused misunderstandings about the environment, illustrated in the famous exchange between Colonel Harry Summers and a North Vietnamese colonel in Hanoi in April 1975:

"You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," said the American colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. "That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelevant."⁵

The U.S. experience in Vietnam was not the result of inexperience with unconventional war. The Seminole War, actions against the Plains Indians, the effort to subdue and colonize the Philippine Islands, and the "small wars" in Latin America all contributed to a history that bears relevance to operations in low intensity conflict environments. The codification of the Marine Corps' experience appears in a 1940 work entitled *Small Wars* that provides insights into the psychological nature of these environments and offers practical measures to military forces operating within them. However, the onset of

²Counterterrorism (CT) refers to apprehending and punishing terrorists; antiterrorism refers to measures taken to change or prevent terrorist behavior as well as physical security measures erected against terrorist threats.

³They have also been addressed in Special Operations Forces and civil affairs doctrine, because those are the elements of the Army most often associated with unconventional warfare, MOSW, and NCO. For further discussion of the relevant doctrine, see Appendix A.

⁴Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986).

⁵Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* (Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1982), p. 1.

WWII and the Cold War after it brought large-unit operations in a less restrained environment to the forefront of military thinking and practice. The Army built a force structure and organizational culture that became the norm—the European-based, conventionally oriented “concept” with which Krepinevich argues the Army entered Vietnam.

Incorporation of MOSW and NCO into modern doctrine began in the Kennedy era, as will be shown later; separate and distinct doctrinal publications intended for Armywide use did not appear until 1964 with the initial publication of capstone doctrine in this field, FM 100-20, *Counterinsurgency*.⁶ The manual’s treatment of operations within this environment reflected the Army’s experience with guerrillas and partisans; it saw the employment of large formations of U.S. troops, with some reliance on indigenous forces. In 1967, the manual was retitled *Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)* as the Army sought to capture its Vietnam lessons, which included the increasing role civilian agencies must play in a revolutionary or insurgency scenario. U.S. military power played a lesser part in counterinsurgency, as other elements of host nation and foreign power were brought to bear. Later versions (1972 and 1974) amplified this position, and were in fact based on the Nixon, or Guam, doctrine of 1969, which announced a reluctance to commit ground forces to revolutionary conflicts. Clearly establishing the host nation’s responsibility for the conduct of its war, the manuals delineated the Army’s role as providing logistical, training, and advisory assistance, along with a combat role limited to the protection of American forces and activities.⁷

Implementing doctrine flourished—manuals on operations against irregulars and guerrillas and on guerrilla warfare were produced, along with documents on yet another concept: stability operations, defined as the “full range of internal defense and development operations and assistance which we can employ to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which the Government under law can function effectively. . . .”⁸ Widespread use and acceptance of these manuals was diminished by the fact that LIC, especially after Vietnam, came

⁶Within the hierarchy of doctrinal publications, “100” manuals are integrating mediums that bring together all the elements of the field force with which to conduct operations. They serve as the foundation for subordinate doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training.

⁷Rod Paschall, “Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine: Who Needs It?” *Parameters*, Vol. 15, No. 3, Autumn 1985, p. 33.

⁸Letter of Instruction, U.S. Army Combat Development Command, 11 July 1966.

Table 1
U.S. Army Low Intensity Conflict Doctrinal Evolution (1967-1989)

Item	FM 31-23, Stability Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine (1967)	FM 31-25, Stability Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine (1972)	FM 100-20, Internal Defense and Development, U.S. Army Doctrine (1974)	FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict (1981)	FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20
Objectives	Strengthen U.S. and collective security; promote world peace	Create a stable international environment; help others maintain independence; promote common defense and world peace	Promote a cooperative world; protect strategic areas, resources, and markets; help satisfy social and economic aspirations	Assist friendly government to protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency	Joint doctrine. Military force is indirect to achievement of the strategic aim. USA/USAF play supporting rather than prosecution roles
Concept of "The Problem"	Influence of revolutionary Communist doctrine; manipulation of less-developed countries by external powers	Instability derived from infusion of revolutionary Communist doctrine	Dislocation/disorientation of the development process	Social, economic, political factors of developing nations give rise to internal conflict	LIC threat derives from change, discontent, violence, instability, lack of government legitimacy. Threat posed by exploitation of instability by groups opposed to U.S. interests

Table 1—continued

Item	FM 31-23, Stability Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine (1986)	FM 31-25, Stability Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine (1972)	FM 100-20, Internal Defense and Development, U.S. Army Doctrine (1974)	FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict (1981)	FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20
U.S. Army roles	Logistical, training, and operational assistance; large combat forces if needed	Logistical, training, and advisory assistance; phased entry of tiers of combat force if needed; host country has primary manpower responsibility	Logistical and training advice; participation in materiel sales and servicing; careful phased entry of combat forces if needed; host country responsibility	Security assistance, Army support to MAAG three tiers of forces: (1) security assistance force (MTT), (2) overseas general purpose MTOE units, BDE-sized backup, sources used to the maximum feasible extent	Employment of U.S. combat troops in insurgency and COIN. Tasks allocated to active and reserve components; military-to-military exchanges, security assistance

SOURCES: Columns 1–3 from MAJ John M. Oseth, “Where the Army Has Stood: Tracks in the Doctrinal Forest,” *Military Review*, February 1981, pp. 61–71; Columns 4–5 from MAJ M. Brady, “The Army and the Strategic Military Legacy of Vietnam,” Thesis, Master of Military Arts and Science, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1990.

NOTES: MAAG = Military Assistance Advisory Group, MTT = Mobile Training Teams, MTOE = Modified Table of Organization and Equipment.

under the purview of the Special Warfare School at Ft. Bragg (in fact, proponency for LIC doctrine remained at Ft. Bragg until 1984); the units that felt bound by the provisions and practices therein were Special Operations Forces rather than the Army as a whole. The Special Warfare School had published such doctrine before, but it was directed at specialized units, such as FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations*. Unfortunately, however, neither the times (withdrawal from Vietnam and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War) nor the organizational culture (the perception that SOF = LIC) was right for widespread acceptance of the doctrine. Thus was born an element of the collective consciousness of the Army that relegated LIC to the arcane.

The 1981 FM 100-20 was the first titled *Low Intensity Conflict*. It clearly defines LIC, although it subdivides such conflicts by scope and nature of U.S. involvement as Type A (U.S. combat operations) and Type B (non-combat operations), and stresses the Army's Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission in support of another nation's IDAD strategy. In its examination of the combat role, however, the manual differs little from standard tactical doctrine; in fact, every element of the combat arms is represented as of utility. Although the FID operations of advisory assistance, intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, populace and resources control, and tactical operations are described, the tone of the manual is heavily weighted toward combat operations against guerrillas.

General Wallace Nutting, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, reacted to this doctrine and to the inadequacies of the instructional base that used doctrine to prepare soldiers for the field when he complained to TRADOC in September 1982 about "our collective and institutional inability to meet that [Soviet] threat directly and where it is most effective—the low intensity end of the conflict spectrum."⁹ General Nutting's comments were based upon his observations of training provided U.S. units and individuals and that used to prepare soldiers from El Salvador. His message seems to have been a watershed event in that both TRADOC and the Army responded with a new interest in MOSW and NCO capabilities.

The Command and General Staff College (CGSC), whose LIC-related instruction had dropped precipitously since the withdrawal from Vietnam (the LIC instructional committee had been disbanded in academic year (AY) 1981-82), began a comprehensive review and re-

⁹Message, 291420Z Sep 82, CINCSOUTH.

vitalization of its curricula that expanded the core of LIC instruction from a low of 8 hours to 23 hours for AY 1983-84. In January 1983, CGSC hosted a conference to examine LIC training requirements in the Army school system. It produced an instructional model for the Army and provided the impetus for the consolidation of LIC doctrinal issues at Ft. Leavenworth under the aegis of the Combined Arms Center.

The extant doctrine, published in 1990, has been in development since at least 1986, when Field Circular 100-20 was issued. Although it did not have the status of doctrine, the field circular introduced the LIC rubric that encompasses the FID role within an examination of insurgency and counterinsurgency, peacetime contingency operations, peacekeeping operations, and terrorism counteraction. Its salient feature is the indirect application of military power in support of the host nation, placing it in consonance with the National Security Strategy that states in part: "It is the primary responsibility of friendly nations to protect their own interests."¹⁰ Although it is reminiscent of the Nixon Doctrine, this approach is born of an understanding of the effect on political legitimacy of U.S. intervention in a revolutionary environment.

PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT LIC DOCTRINE

One of the most interesting aspects of the present preoccupation with revolutionary warfare is the state of semantic confusion in which it has thrown everybody remotely interested in the subject.

Bernard Fall (1963)

Current LIC doctrine is not without problems. First, it suffers from a muddy definition of LIC, and second, it has not been embraced by the Army. Its convoluted evolution has left the very definition of LIC unclear. The term is used variously to refer to a specific environment, to conflicts within that environment, to categories of operations within that environment, to COIN/insurgency alone, to special operations, and even to all U.S. operations in the Third World.

When used either in reference to the environment or to a given conflict within that environment,¹¹ the term LIC describes a situation in

¹⁰The White House, March 1990.

¹¹In the introduction to FM 100-20, LIC is described as an environment: "Between peace and war is the ambiguous environment which has come to be called low intensity conflict. In LIC, the contribution of military force to the achievement of the strategic

which political, social, and economic considerations may be more important to victory than military combat. Within such an environment, adversaries vie for political legitimacy and popular support and are, moreover, often indistinguishable or inseparable from the general populace. The utility of military force is thus limited and its application can be more counterproductive than productive. Any actions taken under such sensitive political conditions will have to take into account the nature and interests of the population. A country supporting a government in such a conflict will have to adapt its strategy accordingly.¹² This is the definition adhered to in this report.

Limiting the term LIC to this single usage serves two purposes: it ends the confusion surrounding the term and it puts a name to a clearly distinguishable political environment. Moreover, it implies a prescription for such an environment: in terms of the U.S. Army, operations in such environments should be undertaken in support of broader political, economic, and social efforts by the United States or even the host government. Emphasis should be placed on support for improved civil-military relations and respect for human rights. This should be the case whether or not an actual insurgency has developed.

When used in reference to categories of operations (COIN/insurgency, CT, PKO and PCO), on the other hand, the term LIC constrains doctrinal consideration of non-conventional operations to the context of these four categories. Yet the categories themselves serve no useful purpose; they span non-combat to combat operations and have little in common that would logically suggest their relationship within the LIC rubric. Indeed, although the four categories are lumped together

aim is indirect; that is, military operations support non-military operations which establish the conditions under which the strategic aim can be realized." (FM 100-20, 1990, p. v.) The FM 100-20 definition of LIC, however, consistent with that in joint doctrine, is: "Low intensity conflict is a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain certain regional and global security implications." (FM 100-20, 1990, p. 1-1.)

¹²Thomas K. Adams, in "LIC (Low-Intensity Clausewitz)," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 1, No. 3, December 1990, p. 272, wrote that often under such circumstances, "unless a military force is willing to commit something close to genocide, it cannot destroy the opposing force."

in FM 100-20, components of each are addressed in more relevant contexts in many different Army and joint manuals.¹³

Using LIC as an equivalent for COIN/insurgency no longer conforms to the doctrine even though the two terms were considered synonymous at one point in the evolution of LIC. Nor is LIC synonymous with U.S. actions in the Third World. U.S. actions in the Third World, from nation assistance to conventional warfare, are more diverse than LIC would account for. This is also the case for SOF. Special operations include, but are not limited to, LIC operations; they can be conducted by Special Operations Forces as well as by conventional Army forces.

Equating LIC with the low end of an “intensity” spectrum is based on the “spectrum of conflict,” the construct used to rank U.S. operations by “intensity”—low, mid (MIC), and high (HIC). Yet the spectrum does not clearly distinguish between levels of intensity, nor is it clear how intensity is measured: whether it is in terms of lethality, technology, numbers of American forces involved, or some other measure. Indeed, FM 100-20 equates LIC doctrine with diverse operations varying in “intensity.”¹⁴

Finally, whereas the relative status of FM 100-20 vis-à-vis Army capstone doctrine FM 100-5 is arguable, as a separate and distinct document (and doctrine) FM 100-20 resides only in an academic arena, perhaps useful in the classroom to teach principles, but not to live in the mainstream consciousness of the workaday Army. An interview with a Special Forces advisor in El Salvador illustrates this point. Asked if the principles of LIC were valid in his experience, he asked what they were and in what manual they were found. Upon further discussion, he agreed that they applied, but what he had studied at Ft. Leavenworth did not enter into, let alone guide, his everyday duties in a revolutionary environment. Another soldier, deemed typical within his career group, told how his IDAD instruction at the Infantry School was canceled because the lone instructor had been reassigned, and how he had dreaded LIC instruction at the Staff College because he, as a Special Forces officer, would be expected to have an expertise in an area that he had never actually thought about during 13 years in both the infantry and Special Forces.¹⁵

¹³See Appendix A.

¹⁴The Center for Armed Conflict is taking steps now to remove at least MIC and HIC from consideration. An additional step, to remove these terms from the lexicon, would be more beneficial.

¹⁵[Doctrine] must be rooted in time-tested theories and principles, yet forward-looking and adaptable to changing technologies, threats, and missions. It must be

CAPSTONE DOCTRINE AND NON-CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

The Army has in the past incorporated non-conventional issues into its senior tactical manual, FM 100-5, *Operations*, albeit as a result of external pressure. The 1962 version, for example, postulated a "spectrum of war" that progressed from cold war (employment of economic, psychological, and military factors short of overt armed conflict), through limited war (restricted employment of all available warfighting resources), to general war (in which national survival mandates the unfettered use of any and all assets, to include nuclear weapons). This architecture is understandable as an Army response to then Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Maxwell Taylor's national security strategy of "Flexible Response," in contrast to the "Massive Retaliation" it replaced.

The 1962 manual discusses unconventional warfare, military operations against irregulars, and situations short of war. Unconventional warfare, then and now, is composed of the related fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion. Operations against irregulars, broadly defined as all types of non-conventional forces and operations, seek to deter or ameliorate acts of a political, psychological, or economic nature designed to weaken the authority of an indigenous government. The manual cautions that units employed against irregular forces operate in an environment that is both militarily and politically sensitive, and that missions "will frequently include political and administrative aspects and objectives not usually considered normal to military operations." Situations short of war were described as instances of cold war in which military power is employed to attain national objectives in operations not involving formal hostilities between nations; missions included shows of force,

definitive enough to accommodate a wide variety of worldwide situations. Finally, to be useful, doctrine must be uniformly known and understood." (FM 100-5, 1986, p. 6.) That there is confusion within the armed forces over LIC is further illustrated by recurring articles in various professional journals about the tactical use of elements of the combat arms in LIC—attack helicopters and field artillery, for example—with little if any exploration of the psychological consequences of such use. LIC-related writings have rarely deviated from the conventional concept of the use of power. For specific examples, see LTC L. S. Caspar, "Attack Aviation Battalion In Low Intensity Combat," *Army*, August 1990, pp. 58-60; LTC J. C. Merriam, "What Role for Artillery in LIC or MIC?" *Field Artillery*, April 1990, pp. 8-16; Col J. E. DeFrancisco and Maj R. J. Reese, "Nimrod Dancer Artillery: Fire Support in Low Intensity Conflict," *Field Artillery*, April 1990, pp. 17-21. Such writings do not occur only in Army journals: see Captain John L. Byron, "A New Target for the Submarine Force," *Proceedings*, January 1990, pp. 37-39; LtCol Joseph J. Rogish, Jr., "Riverine Assault Craft," *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 1991, p. 84; LtCommander Phillip B. Nelson, letter, *Proceedings*, March 1991, p. 19.

truce enforcement, police actions, and legal occupations. The manual states that in these scenarios, “political considerations are overriding,” a phrase that speaks to the political and psychological nature of the environment and to the fact that a “commander’s authority will be prescribed, particularly in relation to State Department responsibility and that of its representatives . . .”.

The 1968 version of FM 100-5 retained most of the earlier version and addressed a subject that, while not new to the Army’s experience, was renaissant in its doctrine on nation building, in which U.S. forces “assist in the planning and execution of military civic action and other aspects of internal development programs.” Nation building was seen as a modernization process in countries that would assist in preventing or suppressing insurgency. The spectrum defined in the 1962 edition was retained, while a new chapter was added on so-called stability operations to capture the Army’s Vietnam experience. Stability operations were defined as military assistance to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order in which responsible government can function effectively, and to alleviate or ameliorate grievances that could lead to an insurgency. The manual also directed the replacement of the term counterinsurgency with IDAD when describing a nation’s overall national program,¹⁶ and the term stability operations when describing the military portion of the national program. The counterinsurgency era ushered in by President Kennedy was coming to an end.

In the 1976 version of FM 100-5, operations short of conventional war simply disappeared as the Army attempted to put behind it what had been the most traumatic and debilitating period in its existence. A significant change in tactical doctrine occurred with the omission of any discussion of operations short of war. As a reflection of the post-Vietnam era, this version reoriented the Army to the traditional concept of warfighting, postulating the conventional tactical doctrine of Active Defense, a doctrine designed for combat against superior Warsaw Pact forces in Germany that traded space for time, to allow the introduction of reinforcements. Wholly a defensive doctrine, Active Defense acknowledged the quantitative inferiority of NATO forces and the increased lethality of the modern battlefield brought about by advances in technology. The manual ignored scenarios and operations not considered “warfighting”; concomitantly, the Army

¹⁶“Counterinsurgency” had a negative connotation and failed to embrace the positive measures taken to prevent occurrence of insurgency.

school system purged its curricula of any mention of counterinsurgency in general and of Vietnam in particular.¹⁷

The net effect, while ultimately evolving into a competent operational doctrine (as evidenced by Desert Storm), was to convince a generation of soldiers that armies existed solely to fight wars and, consequently, that their energies, training, equipment, and ultimate success lay in the mainstream “concept” of warfighting at the conventional level. LIC and related non-combat tasks were removed from the consciousness of the Army and were relegated to a corps of personnel who stepped outside the mainstream, with the knowledge that they did so at some peril to their careers.¹⁸ That attitude, and the hostility quite often directed toward soldiers in unconventional (SOF) units is illustrated by an extreme, though not uncommon, remark of a commanding officer more than a decade later:

I approve this request [to join Special Forces] only because I want to support my officer's career objectives no matter how ill-advised they may be. However, I believe that the Army leadership must stop this erosion of its top junior talent into Special Forces Branch, which is at best a current fad, and in the long term, a pitiful sideshow from the mainstream Army.¹⁹

The 1982 version of FM 100-5 moved the Army to a more balanced concept of warfare, one that highlighted the offense as the key to victory with the introduction of AirLand Battle (ALB). With the exception of an acknowledgment of Soviet-supported guerrilla or terrorist groups as challenges for the Army, the manual emphasized the application of conventional weaponry within the NATO strategy. ALB, which remains Army doctrine, was an expression of how ground and air forces would deal with the conventionally armed enemy. Unfortunately, however, it continued to dismiss operations and missions not deemed warfighting, that is, LIC operations.

The version of FM 100-5 published in 1986 validated the ALB concept, incorporated comments from the field, and expanded its discussion of the operational level of war with guidance for conducting campaigns and major operations. Significantly, it also acknowledged and discussed, albeit tentatively, operations at the lower end of the spectrum, a result of the doctrinal and educational review engendered by

¹⁷Interviews with senior officers at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, and in Bangkok, Thailand.

¹⁸Michael Perlman, “The Rise and Fall of LIC Doctrine and Instruction,” *Military Review*, September 1988.

¹⁹“Darts and Laurels,” *Armed Forces Journal International*, August 1988, p. 105.

General Nutting's message years earlier. LIC had finally arrived in the mainstream.

In the preface, while stating that it emphasized conventional military operations, the manual "recognizes that Army forces must be capable of operating effectively in any battlefield environment, including low intensity conflict. . .".²⁰ The treatment of LIC, however, was firmly within the context of ALB, stating that "the tenets of ALB apply equally to the military operations characteristic of low intensity war."²¹ As a separate and distinct level of conflict, LIC is given a page in which operations within the categories of COIN, PKO, PCO, and terrorism counter/action (TC/A) are discussed. The net effect, however, is to both raise these issues as part of the capstone operations doctrine and to reduce them to insignificance within the larger framework of ALB, the heart of the manual.

Moreover, the same confusion that surrounds LIC in other doctrinal publications appears in the capstone manuals as well. That LIC is a confusing term, let alone a confusing and frustrating milieu, is evidenced by the manuals' depiction of LIC as a "form of warfare [that] falls below the level of high- and mid-intensity operations and will pit Army forces against irregulars or conventional forces. . .".²² While LIC has appeared on the screen again, it is clearly still held as warfare of a different intensity, with no consideration of non-combat activities; readers are directed to FM 100-20 for a detailed examination of such operations.

JOINT DOCTRINE

In 1986, the Goldwater/Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act mandated that each of the service's doctrines would be subordinate to, and consistent with, joint doctrine. The Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) is the originator of JCS LIC doctrine (JCS 3-07), and the Army Training and Doctrine Command is the primary review authority. Not surprisingly, therefore, joint LIC doctrine reflects FM 100-20 quite closely, to include the definitional confusion and perceived lack of relevance to conventional operations.

Recognizing that doctrine is often at such a level that its relevance in the field is questionable, the Joint Staff and services have begun to

²⁰FM 100-5, May 1986, p. i.

²¹FM 100-5, May 1986, p. 6.

²²FM 100-5, May 1986, p. 4.

produce subordinate documents known as Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) manuals that should prove more useful for those actually involved in LIC. Designed to be "how to fight" manuals, JTTPs will offer practical suggestions to commanders charged with planning and conducting operations in this sensitive environment.

At the joint level, proponency for JTTPs on three of the four operational categories of LIC is vested in the Army's agent, the CLIC. Yet the JTTP for contingency operations falls under JCS 3-0, *Operations*. This disconnect seems to have more to do with the lead agent in the writing of the doctrine (the Army is responsible for the three LIC JTTPs and the Navy is responsible for the PCO JTTP) than with the nature of the operations. The Navy requested and received responsibility for the Peacetime Contingency Operations JTTP manual, arguing that most PCOs have and will continue to require a naval presence: shows of force, non-combatant evacuations, freedom of navigation exercises, and the like. Although this seems to be just another doctrinal inconsistency relating to LIC, it is more significant: it reflects the problems involved in subsuming disparate categories of operations under a single rubric.

4. ALTERNATIVES TO EXTANT LIC DOCTRINE

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States is free to interact with Third World countries without its policies and behavior being channeled through the prism of anti-communism. Policies the United States has often neglected during the last fifty years while fighting Soviet expansionism can now come to the fore. There are two outcomes of this change (as previously discussed): a stated intention on the part of the United States to become involved in peacetime internal defense and development as a means of guaranteeing international stability and security, and increased attention to the strategic requirements of Third World environments, including the need for improved MOSW and NCO capabilities within the Army.¹ Yet extant doctrine provides inadequate guidance for either peacetime missions or non-conventional operations. Army LIC doctrine is not only fraught with confusion, but most soldiers are unfamiliar with it. Current Army capstone doctrine makes little mention of a peacetime mission, MOSW or NCO. And joint LIC doctrine is little more than a restatement of Army doctrine, with the exception of the TTPs.

New doctrine, both Army and joint, in conceptual and draft stages in 1991, showed promise of addressing some of these issues. If the work becomes doctrine, the Army's peacetime mission as well as its MOSW and NCO capabilities will both be more coherently and completely covered than at present.² Foremost among the concepts emerging in doctrine and testimony were "peacetime engagement" and the "operational continuum." Peacetime engagement responded to the United States' perceived post-Cold War role in guaranteeing international stability and security. Although peacetime engagement was not codified in doctrine, it was the first conceptual step taken in defining the United States' post-Cold War security policy. Peacetime engagement has since gone out of use, however, as both term and

¹Since the writing of this report, the United States' post-Cold War role in foreign internal defense and development has become less clear and is in the process of revision.

²See JCS Test Pub 3-0, in which LIC is used in reference to environment, operations, and U.S. Army missions. See also the draft version of Army Pub FM 100-5 (1992), where the term LIC is used sparingly and only in direct reference to environment. TRADOC Pam 525-5 (August 1991) refers specifically to operations short of war, and indeed, redefines the operational categories currently subsumed under LIC as operations short of war (p. 26) thus resolving the confusion between LIC as environment and LIC as operations.

concept. It is nonetheless useful to compare evolving definitions of the United States' peacetime responsibilities with this early policy which drew both enthusiastic support and spirited criticism. Despite being short-lived, peacetime engagement embodies the debate about the United States' appropriate post-Cold War international role—particularly regarding the changing missions of the U.S. military. The operational continuum on the other hand, is a less controversial joint concept used in place of the spectrum of conflict to define the range of environments (peacetime competition, conflict, and war) within which the military may operate. It is already being incorporated into doctrine, which is significant insofar as it represents a peacetime mission for U.S. forces in addition to their responsibilities in conflict and war.

PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

Peacetime engagement was enunciated in the 1991 Cheney Report as:

a strategy that seeks to counteract violence and promote nation-building. Military forces can be employed directly or indirectly to counter violence associated with threats such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, subversion, and insurgencies and, when necessary, to aid democratic freedom fighters against repressive regimes. Peacetime engagement also includes security assistance for unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. The criteria for victory in the application of these programs are successfully providing local security and winning popular support. Concurrent with the restoration of a stable security environment, various instruments of U.S. national power are engaged to promote private enterprise and market-oriented economic growth, democracy and political reform, justice and respect for human rights, and an environment conducive to representative government.³

In its 1991 formulation, peacetime engagement was an updated version of LIC, redesigned for post-world war application. It was composed of similar activities but based on a different philosophy. Whereas in LIC the true interests of the U.S. government lay in countering the communist threat, and development and democracy were considered means by which that goal could be reached, in peacetime engagement democratization and development are goals in

³*Annual Report to the President and the Congress 1991*, pp. 6–7; for other mention of "peacetime engagement" see the *Statement of the Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney Before the House Armed Services Committee in Connection with the FY 1992–93 Budget for the DoD*, 7 February 1991, pp. 5–6; "The Strategy of Peacetime Engagement," prepared by Mr. Snyder and COL Davidson, OASD(SO/LIC)PP; "Peacetime Engagement," James R. Locher III, prepared for the First Annual Symposium of the American Defense Preparedness Association's SO/LIC Division.

and of themselves, under the (oft-debated) assumption that they will lead to international security and stability.⁴

Like LIC, peacetime engagement semantically equated U.S. operations within an environment with the environment itself, thereby risking insult to a host nation involved in a struggle for its existence. Indeed, the word “peacetime” was as inaccurate and insensitive to a host nation as the term “low intensity,” especially if the United States were to be involved in foreign internal defense or COIN/insurgency operations. Unlike LIC, peacetime engagement was not codified in doctrine, except to the extent that the goals of stability and security and the inclusion of the operational continuum in doctrine represent the Army’s renewed commitment to operations in peacetime as well as in conflict and war. Indeed, despite the renunciation of peacetime engagement, this commitment to peacetime operations is still under serious consideration. In the draft version of FM 100-5 (1992), Chapter 3, “Army Doctrine for Operations,” describes the Army’s peacetime mission in the following way:

The ultimate purpose of the Army is to defend the country and its interests in time of war. Often, however, our national interests are threatened in circumstances short of war.... Our ability to exert a positive influence on the development of nations through assistance in the building of institutions and infrastructure that can deliver security and stability for the population will be as challenging as conducting a combat operation.

Closely tied to this perceived peacetime mission is increased emphasis in the doctrine on indirect operations short of war:

[S]ecurity and stability are only achieved through indirect action that addresses the underlying causes of conflict in the developing world.... Indirect operations designed to alleviate the underlying conditions of conflict can reduce the probability and the need for direct application of a U.S. military combat force.⁵

This increased interest in indirect operations short of war can be viewed in two ways. On the one hand, some fear that it represents the Army’s desire to become involved too deeply and inextricably in humanitarian assistance and other indirect operations short of war

⁴See footnote 2. In “The Strategy of Peacetime Engagement,” Snyder and Davidson write: “It is a... daunting task to develop an infrastructure or nurture democracy in a timely fashion, within a fledgling system, with little or no democratic history, and within a zone of terror. In fact, it is nearly impossible, and makes clear why counteracting violence (if it exists) is where Peacetime Engagement must start.”

⁵Chapter 3, Draft version of FM 100-5 (1992).

which can be, and in fact are already, carried out by U.S. civilian agencies, like USAID. The extent to which this becomes a problem will be determined by a number of factors. For example, U.S. forces already play roles in disaster relief and humanitarian and civil assistance, with their activities circumscribed by law.⁶ Also, many Army peacetime efforts are in support of other agencies. If, within this context, the Army performs short-term functions for which it is uniquely capable, it could be argued that such activities serve as on-site training and practice. Finally, some fear that a relatively greater amount of conventional manpower and resources will be dedicated to these indirect operations, at the expense of warfighting readiness. Currently, most Army responsibilities in this arena reside in the Special Operations Forces and the Civil Affairs component of the Selected Reserve. Changes in mission involving greater use of conventional medical, engineer, military police, transportation, and logistics personnel in nation assistance and foreign internal defense could potentially threaten warfighting capability. On the other hand, the Special Forces serve as an excellent example of how forces can have both combat and non-combat capabilities germane in peace, conflict, and war.⁷

The increased emphasis in the doctrine on indirect operations—divorced from the issue of peacetime engagement—could be extremely positive if it represents enhanced sensitivity within the conventional Army to non-conventional combat environments. This will be especially important if the U.S. Army is reorganized into rapidly deployable contingency forces. As was proven when applied in Panama and Kuwait, sensitivity to the cultural and political environment within which U.S. forces are operating can save lives, limit collateral damage, and smooth the transition from war to peace.

THE OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM

The other new concept in doctrine, the operational continuum, also reflects the interest in peacetime missions. More than just introducing a peacetime mission for the Army, however, the operational continuum allows visualization of operations across all environments—

⁶The Stevens Authority (10 USC 405) limits DoD activities in general to those "incidental to authorized military operations in a foreign country." The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), within USAID, controls military involvement in disaster relief operations.

⁷SOF forces played key combat roles in Operation Desert Storm, for example, and also have been closely involved alongside conventional troops in the postwar efforts to rebuild Kuwait.

peacetime competition, conflict, and war.⁸ The operational continuum has significant advantages over LIC and the spectrum of conflict. Whereas the old spectrum of conflict depicted three distinct "levels" or environments—low-, mid-, and high-intensity conflict—the operational continuum depicts subtle increments wherein peacetime competition, conflict, and war are differentiated by degree (of combat-sustainment, combat-intensity, utility of non-military forms of influence, intended outcome, etc.) rather than level of intensity.⁹ See Figure 1.

Draft and test doctrine¹⁰ represent the operational continuum as a single line, with "peacetime competition," "conflict," and "war" making up the points of the continuum. "Peacetime competition" is defined as a state "wherein political, economic, informational and military measures, short of combat operations or active support to warring parties, are employed to achieve national objectives." "Conflict" is an "armed struggle or clash between organized parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives." And "war" is the "sustained use of armed force between nations or organized groups within a nation involving regular and irregular forces in a series of connected battles and campaigns to achieve vital national objectives."¹¹


Underlying the operational continuum is a further construct: the relative utility of various instruments of influence available to the United States (political, informational, economic, and military). Across the continuum, the political instrument remains predominant. During peace, it is followed by economics and information and then the military. In times of conflict, economics, information, and the military are coequal tools. In times of war, the military takes precedence over economics and information. Figure 2 illustrates this construct.

⁸The Army, FM 100-1 Draft (August 1991), has been revised to include the operational continuum. (p. 7). Moreover, the description offered of the Army's role in peacetime competition is extremely similar to the evolving concept of peacetime engagement, including an emphasis on the need for interagency coordination and special sensitivity to the political environment in the host nation the United States is supporting.

⁹See *The Operational Continuum and LIC*, Lt Col Wm. F. Furr, USAF, AirLand Bulletin 90-1, 30 March 1990; "Toward a More Complete Doctrine: SOF in ALBF," Major William H. Burgess III, U.S. Army, *Military Review*, February 1991; JCS Test Pub 3-0, p. I-6, where it is explained that although states along the continuum are described in discrete terms, "in actual circumstances there may be no precise distinctions where a particular state ends and another begins."


¹⁰See JCS Test Pub 3-0.

¹¹JCS Test Pub 3-0, pp. I-6 and I-7.



SOURCE: Major William H. Burgess III, "Toward a More Complete Doctrine: SOF in ALBF," *Military Review*, February 1991, p. 34.

Figure 1—The Operational Continuum



SOURCE: Draft version, FM 100-5, *Operations* (1992), 5 April, 1991, U.S. Army, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Figure 2—Role of the Military

The operational continuum is not dynamic; conflicts will not necessarily proceed along the continuum in either direction. Rather, the operational continuum depicts the relationship of environment to time and space. It illustrates the parallel rather than the sequential nature of actions and programs, and the absolute requirement for unity of effort between all the entities engaged. Using the continuum as a reference, one can better understand how MOSW are synchronized in time to achieve long-term objectives, whereas combat operations are synchronized in physical space to shape the battlefield, conduct the battle, and disperse for reconstitution purposes. This construct thus clarifies the flexibility of U.S. operations; FID, for example, can be used across all environments. Even during a war, the United States can continue to help a government or resistance group increase its legitimacy vis-à-vis the civilian population. In El Salvador, even as the war between the government and the FMLN dragged on, the United

States continued to address training and other problems in the Salvadoran military.¹² In Panama, as previously mentioned, psychological operations (PSYOP) and civic assistance¹³ were used during the invasion itself, and disaster relief capabilities, civil affairs, and other humanitarian operations were undertaken in its aftermath.

The operational continuum also avoids the potential ethnocentrism of the spectrum of conflict. It refers to the environment as it affects all the actors, regardless of the level of U.S. involvement. This also resolves any confusion between operations and environment, and clearly illustrates that various actors can carry out diverse operations across environments. In other words, unlike the spectrum of conflict, the operational continuum does not define the environment by U.S. actions.

FM 100-5 (1992)

The recent interest in peacetime engagement may be having an influence on doctrine, but the more dominant emphasis in doctrinal revisions appears to be on capabilities across all environments (peace, conflict, and war) with increased attention to the roles of MOSW and NCO. The in-progress revision of FM 100-5, for example, forcefully brings military operations short of war back to the Army's consideration. Guidance for the work from the Training and Doctrine Command identifies FM 100-5 as capstone doctrine for operations across the continuum, reflecting "an evolution of our current capstone doctrine, AirLand Battle."¹⁴ Expanding the range of operations that face the Army, the guidance directs the discussion of developed and undeveloped theaters, with emphasis on contingency operations, and further directs that the manual should retain the "human dimension and the importance of an understanding of the dynamics and intangibles associated with war."¹⁵

With that and subsequent guidance that changes the doctrine from "AirLand Battle" to "AirLand Operations," preliminary work revises the operations doctrine to incorporate a broader vision of the Army's missions. It both incorporates the tenets of, and assumes ascendancy

¹²This example also illustrates that U.S. operations are not always successful, especially if they are aimed at the transformation of an entire political-economic system.

¹³The U.S. defensive occupation of Panama City's public utilities during the course of the invasion is an example of civic assistance during a conflict.

¹⁴Memo, TRADOC, "Guidance for Revision of FM 100-5, *Operations*," 12 October 1990.

¹⁵Ibid.

over, FM 100-20. In doing so, the manual posits the Army's role whether in peace, conflict, or war, as either combat operations or operations short of war, defined as "Direct and indirect operations short of war designed to promote security and stability, reduce the potential for or the escalation of hostilities, and/or to gain control of a situation." Within that description, direct operations are primarily military, designed to constrain or restrain an adversary through threatened or limited use of force. Examples include shows of force, limited use of force (raids, etc.), and combating terrorism, among others. Indirect operations are primarily multi-department, multi-agency, or multi-national actions designed to influence stability and security, such as PKOs, forward deployments, nation assistance, and support to civil authorities. Military support within the framework of peacetime engagement would most likely take the form of these indirect operations. Reference to such operations is the closest doctrine comes to specifically addressing non-conventional types of operations. This is a good start, but it will have to be carried through not only in terms of the final version of FM 100-5, but in terms of training and preparation of conventional as well as special operations forces.

The revision of FM 100-5 also incorporates two tenets of LIC doctrine, political dominance and legitimacy, and applies them to U.S. operations. The purpose of their inclusion in FM 100-5 is to sensitize soldiers and leaders to the aspects of missions and roles that transcend the purely military. Such an awareness is vital to all operations but is of particular relevance to MOSW—conducted in an often psychologically charged environment in which individual actions can have consequences out of proportion to their size.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Draft doctrine—TRADOC Pam 525-5, FM 100-5 (Draft), FM 100-1 (Draft), etc.—seems to be slowly reintegrating operations short of war and non-combat operations as well as new peacetime missions. The former is important because U.S. troops—if they are to function effectively in politically sensitive environments, either as trainers or in combat—must receive training themselves in civil-military relations and the issues related to foreign internal defense and development. The latter is critical if the U.S. military is going to be effectively involved in a broader U.S. peacetime effort to promote development and democratization in the Third World.

The extent to which the Army must remain focused on warfighting operations that ensure tactical success, with less attention to the effects on the political or psychological environment, is nonetheless far from resolved.¹ Purists within the Army maintain their strong predisposition toward the underlying philosophy of AirLand Battle—overwhelming force as a means of limiting the length of a conflict as well as the loss of American lives. They merely point to the United States' impressive performance in Desert Storm as support for their position.² At the other extreme, policymakers and some members of the armed forces are pushing for an increased non-conventional capability, involving precisely those skills that the traditionalists reject. These people look to the post-Cold War environment and its latent instability to define the role of the U.S. armed forces in the future.

The outcome of this debate, and the future of FM 100-5, will be decided with Army Chief of Staff Gordon R. Sullivan and the philosophy he brings to his position. However, greater doctrinal attention to the role of the political environment in, and preceding, low intensity conflicts, NCO, and MOSW would prepare the Army for a key role in fulfilling broader U.S. regional interests. Increasing the U.S. Army's

¹At a recent seminar offered by a senior Army officer at RAND, for example, AirLand Operations (ALO) was introduced as evolving doctrine. Yet it was presented only in terms of battle, with no discussion of its applicability across the operational continuum. Indeed, the seminar concluded by illustrating how the precepts of ALO were effective because of their successful application in Operation Desert Storm. The discussion's emphasis was on "winning" and no mention was made of the role of ALO doctrine in U.S. support to foreign countries.

²Indeed, even in the evolving concept of AirLand Operations, overwhelming force and overmatch (fighting capability) are considered the appropriate methods for fighting regional contingencies.

flexibility by preparing it for contingencies and environments other than battlefield warfare (as well as for battlefield warfare) can make the Army an essential—rather than an obsolete—tool of U.S. foreign policy in the “New World Order.” To this end, doctrine must provide clear guidance, bringing non-conventional issues and sensitivities back to the mainstream consciousness in a utilitarian, practicable manner.

Appendix A

PERTINENT DOCTRINE


PROCESS OF DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

Army

Army doctrine is developed in tandem with training, leadership, organization, and materiel (DTLOM) through a complex process of identifying and prioritizing Army requirements across all five domains. The Concept-Based Requirements System (CBRS), as this process is known, is used by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop resource-constrained strategies to improve Army capabilities. CBRS consists of both continuous and cyclic events that deliver analytically based decision support material with which to develop objectives. The system is designed to capture the information needed to fully justify and support acquisition, manpower, and ultimately, budgetary resources. The cyclic events are divided into three formal phases (see Figure 3): planning guidance and concept formulation, needs identification, and solution prioritization. Guidance, derived from Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Office of the Joint Staff (JS), and Department of the Army (DA) documents, provides specific information on priorities, warfighting concerns, and areas of emphasis for the domains. Concepts provide realistic, feasible projections of combat that consider history, extant doctrine, current capabilities, future threats, and new technologies.¹

The doctrinal portion of this process for capstone manuals such as FMs 100-5, 100-20, and 100-25 begins with delegation of responsibility to a proponent at either an integrating center or branch. The proponent designates a writing team which charts an 18–24 month timeline for the publication of a field manual. The first product, the coordinating draft, is issued for comment in about six months. An initial doctrinal review occurs after comments are received and are either incorporated or become discussion points in a Doctrinal Review and Approval Group (DRAG) session, in which the proponent briefs (and defends) his work before a General Officer review hosted by the

¹Concepts differ from doctrine in that they identify required—but not yet attained—capabilities for the future, whereas doctrine directs the application of attained capabilities.



SOURCE: TRADOC Regulation 11-15.

NOTE: BFMA = Battlefield functional mission area
 BDR = Battlefield development plan
 IC = Integrating center.

Figure 3—The Concept-Based Requirements System

TRADOC Commander and sponsored by the TRADOC Directorate of Training and Doctrine. Problems are identified, positions examined, and decisions made for the final version of the work. With guidance derived from the DRAG, and upon resolution, a final approved draft enters publication channels.

Joint

Joint publications are developed out of a process of consensus, whereby all the services and the joint doctrine branch (J-7) work together to create a mutually satisfactory manual. Publications begin with a project proposal, submitted by the services, combatant commands, or the joint staff. After a validation process, including a joint doctrine working party meeting, a lead agent for the project is named, the dimensions of the project are outlined, and a program directive is developed that formally delineates the role of the lead agent. The lead agent then tasks a primary review authority with the development of the manual. The developing organization must provide the services, combatant commands, and the joint staff with two working drafts: the initial and the final. When all outstanding issues have been resolved, the final draft is submitted to the directorate, J-7, for approval as a test publication. Test publications can be used as interim doctrine on a case-by-case basis. After conversion of the final draft into a test publication, the new joint doctrine is evaluated by the Chairman, Joint Staff. Once the evaluation has been completed and necessary changes have been made, the test publication is forwarded to the designated joint staff sponsor, who initiates a formal staffing action (MOP 9) to receive formal approval from the Chairman, Joint Staff.²

RELEVANT DOCTRINE

The following passages are excerpted and paraphrased from the Army and joint manuals most relevant to the four functional areas addressed specifically in this study: foreign internal defense (FID), disaster relief, civic action, and counternarcotics.

²For a more detailed discussion of the joint doctrine development process, see F. C. Moen and D. T. York, *Compendium of Joint Publication Abstracts* (Joint Staff, 1990) pp. 5–8. Note: In 1986, the Goldwater/Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act mandated that each of the service's doctrines would be subordinate to, and consistent with, joint doctrine. One can therefore glean a sufficient understanding of the various armed forces' doctrinal treatment of any given issue by looking at one services' doctrine or joint doctrine relating to that issue.

**FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, JCS Pub 3-0, JCS Pub 3-07, and Related
JTTP 3-07.1**

FID operations: “The United States will use its military resources to provide support to a host nation’s counterinsurgency operations in the context of foreign internal defense (FID). FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies in any of the action programs another government takes to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The US ambassador, through his country team, provides the focal point for interagency coordination and supervision of FID. Military support to FID is provided through the unified CINC. The United States conducts FID operations in accordance with the IDAD concept. Military resources provide materiel, advisors, trainers and security assistance forces to support the host nation government’s counterinsurgency operations through security assistance organizations (SAO).”³

Civic Action: “Civic action” refers to U.S. military operations in support of a host nation’s development or repair of its infrastructure. Civic action is one of the forms of direct assistance that the U.S. Army can employ in counterinsurgency situations. “Operations by US forces can include building roads and installing communications systems done in conjunction with host nation forces to develop critical infrastructure or facilities. Other US operations can include running hospitals or medical facilities, providing air traffic control or running supply and maintenance depots.”⁴ The Army may also employ civic action in support of counter-drug operations.⁵

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) operations should not be confused with the more general category of operations, civic action. HCA may not be provided to individuals, groups, or organizations engaged in military or paramilitary activities. The sole purpose of HCA operations is prevention: to “provide a mechanism through which US military personnel and assets augment other US non-military programs to assist Third World populations. HCA improves the quality

³FM 100-20/AFP 3-20 (1990), p. 2-18.

⁴Ibid., p. 2-20.

⁵Ibid., p. 5-9. Counter-drug operations are defined in Army doctrine as: “Military or police action to prevent trafficking in illegal drugs; includes intelligence, surveillance, border patrol, inspections, raids, and other operations.” (Glossary, 3.) The term counter-drug is generally preferred by the Army to the term counternarcotics for purely semantic reasons; “drugs” is simply considered a more pejorative term than “narcotics,” and is understood to encompass both legal and illegal substances, whereas narcotics may refer more commonly to legal substances. There is as yet no approved joint term or definition, although in JCS Pub 3-07 the term counternarcotics is used instead of counter-drugs.

of life through rudimentary construction, health care, and sanitation programs. Engineer, medical and SOF are the principal forces used in these programs. These operations are defined by law and limited to

- Medical, dental and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.
- Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
- Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
- Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

The Department of State must approve most HCA operations and the US Congress funds them through appropriations specifically set aside for HCA. . . . These operations assist a host nation to attack the causes of instability. They can help prevent the need for greater assistance at a later date. HCA operations may also take place in peacekeeping operations, or in the limited circumstances of peacetime contingency operations.”⁶

Although one could argue that HCA operations can be used in the aftermath of conflict to help rebuild a country devastated by war, the doctrine makes it clear that HCA operations are intended to be used in support of something akin to peacetime engagement.⁷ Civic action, on the other hand, may be used across the operational continuum. As in Panama, civic action can be used in tandem with combat operations to limit infrastructural damage during conflict, thus limiting hardship and possibly injurious political effects to the host nation government.

Counter-drug operations: In FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, counter-drug operations are categorized as peacetime contingency operations in support of U.S. civil authority. They are carried out under, and limited

⁶Ibid., p. 2-23. Civic action should not be confused with civil affairs (CA) either. Civil affairs are defined as “Those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or occupied country or area when military forces are present.” (JCS Pub 1-02.) Civic action is one aspect of civil affairs, but civil affairs refers more generally to the political and social relationship between the military and civil authorities. Finally, civic action should not be confused with civil-military operations (CMO), which are U.S. military efforts in support of an insurgency against a foreign government. (See FM 100-20/AFP 3-20 (1990), Glossary, 1.)

⁷For those interested in the joint doctrine relevant specifically to peacetime engagement, guidelines for unified operations in peacetime are laid out in Chapter II, JCS Test Pub 3-0 (January 1990), pp. II-1 through II-12. Combined operations in peace are discussed in Chapter IV (Ibid., pp. IV-3 through IV-7).

by, the Posse Comitatus Act and other laws and regulations. "Military forces may be involved in a variety of actions taken to detect, disrupt, interdict and destroy illicit drugs and the infrastructure (personnel, materiel, and distribution systems) of illicit drug trafficking entities. Such actions will always be in support of one or more governmental agencies such as the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Border Patrol of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State, or the Drug Enforcement Agency. . . . Military support to counter-drug operations can include—

- Mobile training teams
- Offshore training
- Advisory personnel
- Logistic support (materiel, maintenance, resupply and transportation)
- Civic action
- Informational, detection and surveillance operations
- Intelligence support.

When military forces are employed as a unit in a counter-drug mission, that operation assumes the characteristics of a traditional conventional military operation. In those instances, military forces will be under the control of a unified CINC.⁸

JCS Pub 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, classifies counter-drug (referred to as counternarcotics) operations as peacetime contingency operations in support of the counternarcotics efforts of other U.S. agencies, the states, or cooperating foreign governments. The manual specifies the need to "attack the flow of drugs at each phase of the supply cycle: at the source, while drugs are in transit, and during distribution."⁹ Finally, in Chapter II ("Unified Operations in Peacetime") of JCS Test Pub 3-0 (January 1990), counternarcotics operations are included with contingency operations as two possible interagency activities in peacetime. Here, the responsibilities of the CINCs in counternarcotics operations are laid out very specifically.

Disaster Relief: Disaster Relief is also categorized as a peacetime contingency operation. "Disaster Relief operations provide emergency

⁸FM 100-20/AFP 3-20 (1990), pp. 5-8, 5-9.

⁹Final Draft, JCS Pub 3-07 (January 1990), p. V-16.

relief to victims of natural or manmade disasters. They respond to requests for immediate help and rehabilitation from foreign governments or international agencies. They may include refugee assistance, food programs, medical treatment and care, damage control, or other civilian welfare programs. When properly managed, US participation in disaster relief should have significant, positive effects. The military can provide the logistic support to move supplies to remote areas, extract or evacuate victims, provide emergency communications, conduct direct medical support operations, provide emergency repairs to vital facilities, or can provide manpower for civil relief. Military elements involved in disaster relief operations are often responsible for the following:

1. Supporting execution of the assistance program developed by the Department of State's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. All military support must be approved by the Department of Defense.
2. Assessment of the damage, the extent of the disaster, and the internal capabilities of the host nation to deal with the emergency.”¹⁰

The most current version of FM 100-20/AFP 3-20 was published in 1990. The test publication for the revised version of JCS Pub 3-07 has been released, and the final version is slated to be approved in October 1992. The test publication for JTTP 3-07.1 is due to be approved in May 1992, and the final version is scheduled for a May 1994 approval.

JCS Pub 3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs Operations

JCS Pub 3-57 refers to specific operations in terms of the civil affairs assets that may be used to support them.

FID operations: Civil affairs personnel “assist and advise US Special Operations Forces (SOF), and indigenous military forces and government agencies in planning and executing population and resource controls, civic action, and other security, developmental and stability programs.”¹¹

¹⁰Ibid., pp. V-8, V-9; FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, p. 5-8. The Army manual points out that “In the LIC environment, disasters can worsen an already unstable situation. When properly orchestrated, US participation in disaster relief can have significant, positive effects.”

¹¹Initial Draft, JCS Pub 3-57 (May 1990), p. II-4.

Disaster Relief and Civic Action: Disaster relief and civic action are classified as civil affairs operations and can be undertaken “during or in conjunction with PCO [peacetime contingency operations].”¹² Because disaster relief and civic action operations are usually multi-agency operations,¹³ they are treated in the various doctrine both as peacetime contingency operations (FM 100-20/AFP 3-20 and JCS Pub 3-07) and as civil affairs operations that can take place in support of PCO (JCS 3-57).

The revised version of JCS Pub 3-57 was to be released in test form in July 1991, with the final version scheduled for July 1993 approval.

JTTP for Contingency Operations (3-00.1) Under the Capstone Doctrine (3-0) for Joint Operations

Contingencies are defined as unplanned operations involving military forces, most often (but not exclusively) emergencies, “caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or . . . required military operations.”¹⁴ Contingency operations may be designed to “promote regional stability, support foreign policy, defend US interests and citizens abroad, conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, [and] sustain military operations across the operational continuum.”¹⁵ FID/IDAD, disaster relief, counternarcotics, and civic action can thus be classified as contingency operations and are included in JTTP 3-00.1. As mentioned above, these four types of operations are also classified as peacetime contingency operations in joint and Army capstone LIC doctrine. The doctrinal difference between contingency operations and peacetime contingency operations is chiefly organizational: because the Navy acted as the lead agent in the preparation of the JTTP for contingency operations (by reason of its traditional performance of non-combat evacuation operations [NEO], peacetime presence and show of force missions), the JTTP was subsumed under joint operations doctrine rather than under joint LIC doctrine. Although they differ slightly definitionally,¹⁶ contingency

¹²Ibid., p. II-8.

¹³Final Draft, JCS Pub 3-07 (January 1990), p. V-8.

¹⁴JCS Pub 1-02, Department of Defense.

¹⁵F. C. Moen and D. T. York, *Compendium of Joint Doctrine Publication Abstracts*, p. A-14. The operational continuum is a construct illustrating the various environments of peace, conflict, and war, as well as the incremental changes between them.

¹⁶Peacetime contingency operations are defined as: “Politically sensitive military operations normally characterized by the short-term, rapid projection or employment of

operations and PCO basically refer to the same kinds of operations. The revised version of JTTP 3-00.1 is projected to be released as a test publication in October 1992 and in its final form in October 1994.

JCS Pub 3-05 and Doctrine for Army SOF, FM 100-25

FID operations: FID is one of the Special Operations Forces' primary missions. However, "FID is not exclusively a SOF mission. It is a joint and interagency activity in which SOF participate. The primary SOF mission in FID is to train, advise, and support HN [host nation] military and paramilitary forces conducting counterinsurgency operations. SO FID missions may be unilateral in the absence of any other US military effort. More frequently, however, they support other ongoing US military assistance efforts. They may also support the employment of conventional military forces . . . SOF may conduct or support any of the major types of FID operations: advisory assistance, intelligence activities, civil-military operations (CMO), and tactical operations. . . . Tactical operations should be part of a synchronized effort to gain broader objectives."¹⁷

Civic Action and Foreign Disaster Relief: SOF perform civic action and disaster relief in the context of humanitarian assistance (HA), one of the collateral activities SOF conduct or support using the capabilities integral to their primary missions. Participation in civic action and disaster relief can take place only if it is approved and subordinate to authorized military operations in a foreign country. Such SOF activities are carefully limited by the Stevens Authority (10 USC 405), the regional commander-in-chief (CINC) or, in some cases, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) within the USAID.¹⁸

Counter-drug operations: "Counternarcotics involve measures taken to disrupt, interdict, and destroy illicit drug activities. The levels of violence used by the drug infrastructure dictate the increased use of military and paramilitary forces in counternarcotics activities. A 1981 amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act (18 US Code 1385) authorizes specific DOD assistance in drug interdiction and drug eradi-

forces in conditions short of war." (FM 100-20/AFP 3-20 [December 1990], Glossary, 6; Final Draft, JCS Pub 3-07 [January 1990], p. xx.)

¹⁷Revised Final Draft, FM 100-25 (October 1990), p. 3-12; Initial Draft, JCS Pub 3-57 (May 1990), p. V-8.

¹⁸Revised Final Draft, FM 100-25 (October 1990), pp. 3-44, 3-45.

cation. The primary SOF role in this interagency activity is to support US and HN counternarcotics activities abroad.”¹⁹

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 3-46, 3-47.

Appendix B

LIC AND THE ARMED FORCES

Low Intensity Conflict: The Mission-Force Match

Mission	Army Forces ^a
Peacekeeping	Military Police
Peacetime Contingency Operations:	
Intelligence-gathering	Military Intelligence, Special Forces, Special Operations Forces
Strike operations:	
Small-scale	SOF: Rangers, Special Forces, etc.
Large-scale	All from small scale plus light infantry, airborne, combat support plus combat service support
Rescue\recovery	SOF: Rangers, Special Forces, etc.
Demonstration or show of force	Airborne, light infantry
Terrorism Counteraction:	
Antiterrorism (defensive)	All forces
Counterterrorism (offensive)	SOF
Counterinsurgency (Foreign Internal Defense and Development)	
Phase One: Latent and incipient insurgency	Engineers, medics, signal, civil affairs, psychological operations, military intelligence, logistics, etc.
Phase Two: Guerrilla Warfare	All from Phase One, plus trainers from Special Forces (sometimes light infantry)
Phase Three: War of Movement	All from Phases One and Two plus conventional forces (primarily light infantry and airborne, later motorized and mechanized)

SOURCE: Major M. M. Zais, "LIC: Matching Missions and Forces," *Military Review*, August 1986, p. 96.

^aForces are listed in general order of appropriateness or sequence of deployment.

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